Ponomarev, head of the international department of the CPSU Central Committee. Ponomarev
The year was 1933.
During the ten years that Stalin was in power, an exceptionally powerful top-secret party intelligence service was created.
The Department of Foreign Relations, which stood at the origins of this organization, remained the structure in charge of foreign policy affairs of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as one of the structural divisions of the governing body of the party. It became that distracting structure about which over the next years the rumor would persist that it was this structure of the Central Committee that was engaged in intelligence work abroad.
Later, many departments of the Central Committee will appear, which will merge as structural units into the department of foreign policy activities of the party and which will be coordinated by a candidate member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev. But this work of his as part of the party’s governing body will be completely understandable and visible; she is for everyone, a “roof”, officialdom, emphasizing his practically inaccessibility... for all kinds of politicians. In addition, the position had all the outward signs of activity to strengthen the international communist and labor movement. Where that policy and that history took place, about which almost no one knows.
But we will return to 1933, when the biography Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev written for official documents: born on January 4/17, 1905 in Zaraisk, now the Moscow region, in the family of an employee. In 1919 he volunteered to join the Red Army. In 1920–1923 on Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk: secretary of the regional committee and member of the bureau of the Ryazan provincial committee of the Komsomol, secretary of the factory party organization. In 1926 he graduated from Moscow State University, and in 1932 from the Institute of Red Professors. From 1926 to 1928 - at party work in Donbass, Turkmenistan. In 1932 he was appointed deputy director of the Historical-Party Institute of Red Professors. In 1934–1936 worked as director of the Party Institute under the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Since 1937 - in the executive committee of the Comintern, etc.
And now I’ll briefly explain: in the USSR almost all the heroes of books, encyclopedias and reference books were “Bolsheviked”, everyone was averaged out and adjusted to ready-made stamps - an almost mechanized, industrial process.
Boris Nikolaevich was born really in the family employee, his father, like many Jews, was an entrepreneur, and a successful one at that, and his mother... In fact, Boris Nikolaevich, as mentioned above, is the son of one of the Russian princes Gagarins. The love of this couple may have begun even before the marriage of Boris’s mother, but the prince was much older than his beloved, had a family and adult children. So they had no prospects for marriage. The desired child was conceived already when this young Jewish woman was married to Nikolai Ponomarev.
In 1919, 14-year-old Boris, together with his father, who had a fairly close relationship with Zabrezhnev, left for one of the Middle Eastern countries, where they stayed for several months and where Nikolai Ponomarev concluded a number of business deals. There, young Borya, in one of the centers for learning psychotechnical techniques of working with people, underwent special training that revealed his unique natural talents.
I can only add that the secrets he learned abroad would seem incredible, impossible, simply unreal to an ordinary person. Mysticism is not the last concept if one had to talk in detail about the time of his stay there; however, mystical miracles happened to this mysterious (to almost everyone) person later, much later...
Upon his return in 1920, 15-year-old Boris was officially assigned to Komsomol and then party work. Whereas in fact, during these years, already in Moscow, he studied in one of the structures of the Special Department of the OGPU. In a short period of time, he brilliantly graduated from the Faculty of History of Moscow State University and passed a number of external exams on knowledge of oriental languages and Romance languages. At the same time, starting in 1922, on the recommendation of Zabrezhnev, he began to work in Stalin’s new party structure, which later became party intelligence.
Even while he was studying at the gymnasium, he - along with Alexander Golovanov, who was on the Volga and other illegitimate children of aristocrats and nobles - was included by Imperial Intelligence in special list, which Count Kankrin handed over to Stalin. Which served as the basis for working in direct subordination to the outstanding genius - the Soviet leader.
In the short time they worked at the monastery, these two young people - Ponomarev and Golovanov - reached the heights of professionalism and until the end of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin's days they were his most reliable assistants.
In addition to the structural divisions named and described above, Ponomaryov and Golovanov implemented other innovations, which (some of them) no one is still aware of.
Let's take at least archives.
It has long been known that the archives of any state, as evidence of its history, are Achilles heel of this state. And with the help of scientists working under the direct supervision of Ponomarev, technologies were developed and implemented for the production of... “archival” documents that had a long history - even since the times of Byzantium! As a result of intense and painstaking work, an anthology of the Byzantine Library, brought by Sophia Paleolog, was created. And also most of the most important documents of Rus', and later of the Russian state... with the necessary edits and adjustments... with new ones, hitherto not known facts …
The real archives - Ponomarev seemed to guess Stalin's thoughts - became the personal property of the leader. No one else had access to them!
It was then that the secret was revealed.” Seven Hills", which, on behalf of Emperor Alexander II, along with the history of the Russian state, was also studied by the great nobleman of the empire, Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin. But at the stage of learning these truths, revealed to a select few, he made a stop, understandable only to him, and... refused to write a book on the history of Rus', reporting this to the sovereign. Instead of this order, a passionate, soulful poem was born “ Bronze Horseman", dedicated to the creator of the Russian state - Peter I.
“Archives” developed in secret laboratories of closed research institutes, when you get acquainted with them, really seem to be dilapidated or close to dilapidated documents. This is confirmed by experts who conduct certain chemical and physical studies! A unique methodology, just as the specialists themselves who worked in the structure of Stalin’s party intelligence were unique. The perfection of the technology for making counterfeits, which have been given for tens, hundreds, or even thousands of years, is such that they cannot be determined by any examination!!!
Doesn’t even this speak of the uniqueness of Russian people, who have surpassed scientists from all over the world in understanding the world?! Or take, for example, the super-project of the 20th century, developed, calculated and tested in the conditions of the party intelligence laboratory - construction of a bridge between the Russian mainland and its land of Alaska. A project commissioned by the scientist by Stalin himself. By the way, this idea arose in the minds of brilliant Russian scientists much earlier, back in the days Russian Empire... Yes, what unimaginable projects were developed!
As for the new-old “archives,” they, having left the walls of the laboratories, immediately became the property of the Soviet state. Then they smoothly became the property of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (CPSU) and much later - the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. Other “archives” were included in the Russian State Archive, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives, the Ministry of Defense, and so on.
What was faked?? First of all, all the archives of the intelligence services of the empire and the USSR, as well as state construction, data on geology and the bowels of the earth, promising concepts for the development of certain fundamental and applied research in domestic science.
Looking ahead to close this topic, I will say that in the 80s of the 20th century, real archives, those that were located after Stalin’s death under the watchful eye of Ponomarev, were discovered and ended up in the Order overseas and in the Group on the banks of the Thames. These two organizations periodically release information about our actual history (naturally, for their own benefit) to their intelligence services, which then gradually distribute information to former Soviet and Russian so-called dissidents, who use this information.
John Erickson, a professor at the University of Edinburgh, deeply respected by our Ministry of Defense, and others use these same documents without a twinge of conscience. Everything is planned, everything is coordinated and is under the strict coordination of the Order and the Group.
History is still falsified, the truth slumbers in secret caches.
...It was from the second half of the 20s of the 20th century that party intelligence, which introduced residents of influence in the Order and Group, was able to direct many processes in its own interests.
So, after Roosevelt came to power, Golovanov, together with his experts, managed to develop and bring to the attention of the United States and, of course, the Order, the idea of the need to create a consolidated special organization from various special forces of the country - a kind of prototype of the future Central Intelligence Agency.
When the US intelligence unit (later the CIA) was developed in the depths of party intelligence, it was envisaged that it should consist of an operational-strategic directorate, which would determine the tasks of obtaining information through human intelligence forces, carry out covert operations, counterintelligence support for undercover activities, and engage in the fight against drugs and terrorism.
The structure is as follows: the directorate should consist of a foreign intelligence unit, which organizes the work of operational departments, which, in turn, are divided into two groups. The first is the geography department, which has divisions for the Soviet Union and its allies, the Middle East and South Asia, East Asia, African countries and Latin America; the second department has divisions in the following areas of activity: foreign resources (undercover and operational work in the United States), international activities (planning and implementation of military and other secret operations), collection of information in the United States, cover, commercial enterprises and others.
It was envisaged to create external counterintelligence to ensure the security of intelligence activities of residencies abroad and the central apparatus, carry out infiltrations into foreign intelligence services and develop foreign specialists and immigrants. Creation of a covert operations unit that develops and carries out these operations; financial planning unit - responsible for financing all activities; technical services division, including technical support covert operations. As well as units: counter-terrorism; anti-drug department, whose employees will collect and analyze all information on drug cartels, develop and implement operational measures against drug trafficking organizations (unprofitable for the United States, i.e. the Order). And more, more... Scientific division; division for the design of technical information collection systems; information and foreign broadcasting service; analytical department...
And soon these and a number of other units appeared, on the basis of which, by the end of World War II, the outstanding organizer of US intelligence, Allen Dulles, created the CIA.
At the same time, USIA appeared - the US information service, which became one of the members of the intelligence communities, which include: DIA, intelligence agencies of the US Army, Air Force and Navy, intelligence organizations of the State Department, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy. As well as the intelligence units of the FBI, the intelligence and research departments of the US State Department.
It was Alexander Evgenievich Golovanov, through the extensive network of his residency in the Order, who contributed to the creation of the American intelligence community.
Thus, the main task of Stalin’s party intelligence was accomplished - not to obtain secret information, but to create it in the depths of the Order and its satellite states, the Group and its satellites, to coordinate and direct them, because there is no other method of suppressing enemy activities Not exists. It’s the same as infiltrating uncontrollable groups of people, becoming the leaders of these groups and leading them in the right direction, because if you destroy them, you can undermine not only the integrity of society, but also the state. For man himself, by nature, consists of advantages and disadvantages, and this ratio is projected onto society itself.
And since we are again talking about the second half of the 20s, I will only add that one of the most important developments of party intelligence then was a unique method of learning foreign languages. As you know, in those years cinema began to become not only sound, but also color, and the speed of the film was set in such a way that people on the screen moved rhythmically and according to perception. It was then that Alexander Golovanov had an idea: what if we insert another frame? This innovation was later called " 25th frame") the film moves at a speed of 24 frames per second, which we perceive consciously when looking at the screen. But if you insert the 25th frame with specific text information, then it will be perceived subconsciously, in other words, we will not see it, we will not understand what is written or depicted, but, nevertheless, we will know what information is contained there.
The effect of this discovery made it possible to convey information directly to the subcortex, bypassing consciousness, which increased the memorization process tenfold. Only decades later will the world know about this; intelligence services will begin to do this in the middle of World War II, when a party intelligence operation was carried out to “dump” the Order with the aim of further transferring this unique method to US intelligence; and after that, Soviet intelligence officers were instructed to obtain this information from... American intelligence services.
It’s a game again, but how could it be otherwise: They should not be solved; and again we hide from the world that in some ways we are stronger, smarter, more cunning...
This is how people get the information they need; and now - the world considers the author of the phenomenon of the 25th frame to be the American psychologist and marketer James Vickery, who conducted “his” experiment in a New Jersey cinema in 1957. During the demonstration feature film two types of pictures were projected onto the screen from the second projector once a second for a fraction of a second: “Coca-Cola” and “eat popcorn”; According to sociologists, after the experiment, the consumption of these particular products increased by 17%. Vaikeri’s “discovery” became public knowledge and brought him huge dividends, but... in 1974, he suddenly, without explaining anything to anyone, renounced authorship. Well, apparently, I realized what kind of “inventor” he is...
Such methods of throwing one's discoveries at the enemy, and then intensively obtaining one's own secret - this is one of the favorite games of the brilliant Soviet leader.
The same thing happened with the nuclear project, allegedly obtained with the help of the NKVD foreign intelligence agent Fuchs; and other similar stories that belong not to Time, but big game…
However, to the question: who is involved in monstrous, inhuman inventions, who is responsible? - the answer is always unequivocal: Americans (or someone else)... but what does WE have to do with it?!
Ponomarev Boris Nikolaevich - (1905 1995), political figure, historian, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1962), Hero of Socialist Labor (1975). In 1961 86 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1972 86 candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Works on the international communist and labor movement... ... encyclopedic Dictionary
Ponomarev Boris Nikolaevich- [R. 4(17).1.1905, Zaraisk, now Moscow region], Soviet statesman and party leader, historian, Hero of Socialist Labor (1975), professor (1932), academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1962; corresponding member 1958). Member of the CPSU since 1919. Born in... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
Ponomarev Boris Nikolaevich
Ponomarev, Boris- Wikipedia has articles about other people with the same surname, see Ponomarev. Ponomarev, Boris: Ponomarev, Boris Dmitrievich (1915 1999) clergyman of the Russian Orthodox Church, mitred archpriest, rector of the Church of Elijah the Prophet in the village ... ... Wikipedia
Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev- (January 17, 1905, Zaraysk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in 1926, as well as the Institute... ... Wikipedia
Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev- Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev (January 17, 1905, Zaraisk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in ... Wikipedia
Agapov, Boris Nikolaevich (politician)- Wikipedia has articles about other people named Agapov, Boris Nikolaevich. Boris Nikolaevich Agapov ... Wikipedia
Ponomarev, Boris Nikolaevich- Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev (January 17, 1905, Zaraisk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in ... Wikipedia
Ponomarev Boris Nikolaevich- Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev (January 17, 1905, Zaraisk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in ... Wikipedia
PONOMAROV- Boris Nikolaevich (1905 95), in 1961 86 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1972 86 candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1962), Hero of Socialist Labor (1975). Works on the problems of the communist and labor movement. Lenin Prize (1982).… …Russian history
PONOMAREV BORIS NIKOLAEVICH - Soviet party leader, figure in the international communist movement, historian, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1962), Hero of Socialist Labor (1975) .
Graduated from the 1st Moscow University (1926), Institute of Red Professor (IKP, 1932). Member of the RCP(b) (1919). During the Civil War of 1917-1922 in the Red Army (1919-1920). In 1920-1923, secretary of the Trans-rayon district committee of the RKSM, member of the bureau of the Ryazan provincial committee of the RKSM. In 1926-1928, at party work in Donbass and Turkmenistan. SSR. In 1932-1934, deputy di-rek-to-ra and ru-ko-vo-di-tel of the department of history of the party of the Is-to-ri-ko-party institute of the ICP (professor with 1932). Director of the Institute of Party History under the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1934-1937). Po-li-tical re-fe-rent sec-re-ta-ria-ta is-pol-ko-ma Kom-mu-ni-sti-che-sko-go in-ter-na-tsio-na-la (1937-1943), assistant to the general secretary of the Is-pol-ko-ma Ko-m-in-ter-na G. Di-mit-ro -va (1937-1943), one of the or-ga-ni-za-to-rov of the communist anti-fa-shi-st-movement of the Co-pro- tiv-le-niya in the 2nd World War. In 1943-1944, deputy director of the Institute of Marx - En-gel-sa - Le-ni-na - Sta-li-na under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) (see). Deputy Head of the Department of Inter-People's Information of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1944-1946). Head of the So-vin-form-bureau under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1947-1949; in 1946-1947, 1st deputy chief). At one time, since 1948, in the foreign-political subdivision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks)-CPSU. Head of the Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties (1955-1957), Inter-People's Department for Relations with the Communist Party -ni-stic parties of capitalist countries (1957-1986), attracted a number of major specialists-between-du-na-to the work rod-ni-kov. Member of the CPSU Central Committee (1956-1989; since 1952 Candidate). Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (1961-1986).
Ku-ri-ro-val kon-tak-you with za-ru-be-us-mi com-part-tiya-mi. Resolved issues related to the races-pre-de-le-ni-em fi-nan-so-howl with the help of com-par-ti-yams of Western countries and le- your movement in the countries of the “third world”, with the preparation and pro-ve-de-ni-em of the co-ve-sh-cha-niy com-mu- scientific and labor parties in Moscow (1957, 1960, 1969). Studying in the training of the new Program of the CPSU (principated in 1961). Actively maintained the course towards des-ta-li-ni-za-tion, pro-vo-di-my N.S. Khrushchev (in the 1970s, Ponomarev did not relate to the torture of L.I. Brezh-ne-va os-to-rozh-but and cha-tich -but real-bi-li-ti-ro-vat I.V. Sta-li-na). Since the beginning of the 1970s, Ponomarev helped develop the interaction of the CPSU with social-ci-al-de-mo-kra-tic parties , mainly on issues of war and peace. One day I tried to develop the ideology of the EU-ro-com-mu-niz-ma (od -on of her ha-rak-ter features - from-ri-tsa-nie uni-ver-sal-no-go ha-rak-te-ra of the Soviet mo-de-li so-tsia-liz-ma) . I considered the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 a mistake.
The author of the work is on the history of the CPSU, the external history of the USSR, the inter-people's communist, ra-bo-thing and national -os-active movement. Ru-ko-vo-di-tel of the author's collection of textbooks "Is-to-ria of the CPSU" (1960; 7th edition, 1984). Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR “Is-to-ria of work and na-tsional-no-os-vo-bo-di-tel-no-go-movement” nia" (1962-1985). Chairman of the editorial board of the “History of the USSR from ancient times to the present day” (volume 1-11, 1966-1980). Lenin Prize (1982).
Na-gra-zh-den or-de-na-mi Le-ni-na (1945, 1958, 1965, 1971, 1975) and others.
From the book by K.N. Brutents “30 years on Old Square”, 1998:
Of course, under the existing system, everything in the International Department was determined mainly by B.N. Ponomarev, the permanent head of the department for more than 30 years. Having joined the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as a young man, he moved in a working environment, then graduated from the Institute of Red Professors. He survived the years of Stalin’s terror as a mature, 40-year-old man who hung around in the circle of “old Bolsheviks.” He was the head of the Sovinformburo, an assistant at the Comintern to Dimitrov (who, judging by his diary entries, did not particularly favor Ponomarev), worked his way up in the Central Committee apparatus from the bottom to the top - to the secretary of the Central Committee, and a little later to a candidate member of the Politburo. He, of course, saw everything. They said, for example, that in his office Rakosi was typing a document - a request for the entry of Soviet troops into Budapest.
Such life path, as it seems to me, determined a lot in the personality of Boris Nikolaevich, his views and inclinations, his likes and dislikes. He was 100 percent a party man in the sense that the concept of “party,” party decisions and instructions, as well as certain forms of behavior, were sacred to him. At the same time, in practice this degenerated into almost automatic obedience to directives from above, unconditional agreement with the opinion of the authorities and non-resistance to it in any case. It seems to me that this excessive lack of independence in decisive moments, the absence of some kind of metal “core” in him, was felt by his colleagues and served as one of the factors that prevented him from achieving his cherished goal - to become a member of the Politburo. The leadership (Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Andropov) did not like Ponomarev, but they tolerated him, taking into account his professionalism of a certain kind.
Boris Nikolayevich’s patron was Suslov, who, however, kept him in the wings and in strictness: he needed, relatively speaking, a “workhorse”, but not a competitor. Ponomarev himself, apparently, felt this position and did not feel very confident. Every time Suslov called, Boris Nikolaevich spoke to him respectfully, not without emotion.
Ponomarev was an intelligent, knowledgeable, well-prepared person, with a very strong memory, which remained clear until last days. But a narrow, often rigidly dogmatic view of things prevailed in him, and at times it was thought that this was, at least in part, his conscious choice, a voluntary self-restraint, so to speak. In his interpretation of events, he was characterized by what I called a police approach to history. “His people”, intelligence efforts - that’s what primarily attracted his attention, although as a Marxist Boris Nikolaevich should have believed that, despite all the importance of these factors, they do not determine the course of social development.
In his many public appearances, he never risked going beyond what had already been said and approved, drying up and discoloring the texts that were prepared for him. They were given originality by a technique that we called “nonomarization”: the grouping of several theses, each of which began with a paragraph opening with a dash. These “tireshki” each time constituted, according to the ironic definition of A. Chernyaev, who worked a lot in this field, “Ponomarev’s teaching.” This was obviously dictated by the fact that from Stalin’s times Boris Nikolaevich retained faith in the miraculous power of the party’s leading word. No wonder his first reaction to any major event was often: “We need to write an article.” He was a man of boring vocabulary, but at the same time he was capable of suddenly delivering a bright speech.
In relations with foreign communist parties, Ponomarev adhered to Comintern traditions. The main one was the position of the CPSU as an infallible guiding force, in fact, as a father party. And when some parties (Italian, Spanish, Finnish, etc.) challenged this situation, it was completely natural for him to support the formation of opposition groups within them. In conversations, he invariably asked whether Moscow Radio was heard in a particular country, and recommended visiting it and speaking. Each time he advised me to work more actively in trade unions and the army. And he suggested that the ruling parties “draw from the cup of experience” of the CPSU and the USSR. Ponomarev's foreign colleagues, partly in accordance with the manner he himself set, treated him with restraint, without warmth. And people like Berlinguer, without the slightest reverence, to say the least*.
*I was convinced of this myself, having attended their conversations twice, last time in 1980 during the funeral of Luigi Longo.
To the credit of Boris Nikolayevich, he was a convinced anti-Stalinist, adhered to this line without hesitation, and stood up for people with a similar reputation. And internationalism for him was not just a slogan, but a chosen position.
Work occupied a central, if not all-encompassing, place in his life. It is characteristic that even after his retirement he came to the Central Committee every day, where Ponomarev, at his request, was given a room in the International Department.
Tempered by the storms of life, he usually maintained his presence of mind in difficult situations and was not prone to violent reactions, at least outwardly. The most typical expression of his surprise or indignation was the phrase: “It boggles the mind.”
I remember that in the spring of 1965, in Volynsky-1 (former Stalin’s dacha), under the leadership of Ponomarev, we were preparing a report on the international situation and activities of the CPSU, which Brezhnev was supposed to speak at the plenum - the first dedicated to these issues after his election as First Secretary of the Central Committee. For Boris Nikolaevich this work was of fundamental importance. Like Ilyichev, another of Khrushchev’s nominees, he was in a “limbo” state. The draft report was handed to Leonid Ilyich on the eve of his departure, together with Andropov, to Budapest. And from there, Yuri Vladimirovich informed by telephone that Brezhnev did not like the draft (with the exception of the section on the national liberation movement) and he asked whether it would be better to cancel the plenum altogether. We were all at a loss, but not Boris Nikolaevich. He gathered us and said that nothing extraordinary had happened, we just had to write a new version in a day or two. Which is what was done.
Another time, in 1972, in Budapest, our group of Hungarians was invited to a restaurant in the so-called “Fisherman's Bastion”. One of its assistants, Ch., who had recently transferred to the department from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, showed an extraordinary indifference to alcohol. Soon he was expressively depicting playing the piano on the table, then invited an Arab lady to dance, causing his rage, and as a result was sent to the residence where we were staying. When we returned; Ch. was not found in his room, but the door to the toilet was locked from the inside. Having opened the door with the help of a locksmith, we found Ch. sleeping, in full dress, on a toilet seat. There was no end to the surprise and indignation of everyone, but Ponomarev limited himself to his “incomprehensible to the mind,” adding melancholy: “They wouldn’t give us something good.”
Boris Nikolaevich understood people. This is also evidenced by the selection of personnel in the department. It is symptomatic that many people came from there who without hesitation and immediately identified with perestroika. Boris Nikolaevich was (with very rare exceptions) polite with his subordinates. Of course, he acted authoritarianly, but you could argue with him, defending your point of view. He once even said to me in his heart: “You love to argue.” But this did not affect his attitude in any way. I think that the spirit of some democracy that existed in the department, to one degree or another, depended on the style of Ponomarev himself, his peculiar “party intelligence.”
He was demanding in his work, and often did not take into account either time or the circumstances of his employees. I called him an “exploiter” to myself. A characteristic detail. In January 1971, after returning from Egypt (I accompanied Boris Nikolaevich on the trip), I was “confined” to the hospital with suspected dysentery. A few days later I received a note from him (I have kept it), where, for the sake of order, he inquired about my health, said that “the draft section on the national liberation movement was rejected when read by the speaker,” and therefore asks “to prepare a new text. Size 7-10 pages.” “We have time,” he added, “only 5 days.” Ponomarev concluded the note with an interesting phrase: “I hope that the material will be good and the work will not harm your health.”
Either dry by nature, or stiffened by life circumstances, Boris Nikolaevich, however, did not distance himself from the concerns of his employees. He treated their weaknesses condescendingly and tried not to offend “his staff”; he behaved simply when traveling, willingly participated in general entertainment, and even acted as lead singer. There was no wall between Ponomarev and the team, although he knew how and liked to keep his subordinates at a respectful distance. He knew and studied the workers, sometimes even showing excessive curiosity. Those who replaced him, Dobrynin and Falin, came from a different system. Friendly towards people, they, however, were not used to working with a team, but preferred to rely on a narrow group of employees close to them. Each of them assumed that they knew everything. Although both were, perhaps, the strongest Soviet ambassadors and outstanding personalities, they did not find themselves here, clearly ending up in the “wrong corridor.” It was also reflected, of course, that some kind of not very clearly defined transition period had begun in the department’s activities and orientation had been largely lost.
A funeral is the last sign of a person’s popularity, the final criterion for the attitude of the living towards the deceased (we are, of course, not talking about dignitaries and official ceremonies - there are a lot of lies and hypocrisy here). So, Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev was seen off on his last journey by many of his former employees. He was, of course, a man of a bygone era and bore its full imprint, but at the same time he belonged to those who themselves left their imprint on it. And one cannot study this era without looking closely at such people.
- (1905 1995), politician, historian, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1962), Hero of Socialist Labor (1975). In 1961 86 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1972 86 candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Works on the international communist and labor movement... ... encyclopedic Dictionary
- [R. 4(17).1.1905, Zaraisk, now Moscow region], Soviet statesman and party leader, historian, Hero of Socialist Labor (1975), professor (1932), academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1962; corresponding member 1958). Member of the CPSU since 1919. Born in... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
Wikipedia has articles about other people with this surname, see Ponomarev. Ponomarev, Boris: Ponomarev, Boris Dmitrievich (1915 1999) clergyman of the Russian Orthodox Church, mitred archpriest, rector of the Church of Elijah the Prophet in the village ... ... Wikipedia
- (January 17, 1905, Zaraysk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in 1926, as well as the Institute... ... Wikipedia
Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev (January 17, 1905, Zaraysk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in ... Wikipedia
Wikipedia has articles about other people named Agapov, Boris Nikolaevich. Boris Nikolaevich Agapov ... Wikipedia
Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev (January 17, 1905, Zaraysk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in ... Wikipedia
Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev (January 17, 1905, Zaraysk, Moscow province; December 21, 1995, Moscow) Soviet party leader. In 1920 23 at Komsomol and party work in Zaraysk, and then in the Donbass and the Turkmen SSR. Graduated from Moscow State University in ... Wikipedia
Boris Nikolaevich (1905 95), in 1961 86 Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1972 86 candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1962), Hero of Socialist Labor (1975). Works on the problems of the communist and labor movement. Lenin Prize (1982).… …Russian history